This article appeared in The Mark on June 15, 2010
Israel is becoming less integral to U.S. influence in the region as Turkey becomes more important.Nearly lost in the furor over the Israeli attack on the Turkish civilian aid flotilla is an incredible assessment delivered by Mossad Chief Meir Dagan on June 1: “Israel is turning from an asset to the United States to a burden.”
Israel is becoming less integral to U.S. influence in the region as Turkey becomes more important.Nearly lost in the furor over the Israeli attack on the Turkish civilian aid flotilla is an incredible assessment delivered by Mossad Chief Meir Dagan on June 1: “Israel is turning from an asset to the United States to a burden.”
As the astute political analyst Eqbal Ahmad first argued in the 1970s, American support for Israel stems not from historical guilt, well-heeled lobbies, or other (often anti-Semitic) conspiracies, but from a fundamental alignment of interests. This alignment existed from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War. It does not any longer.
American support for Israel began wholeheartedly only after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War when Israel defeated the combined armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, assisted by Iraq – the Soviet Union’s primary Arab allies. The “dagger in the heart of the Middle East,” as many Arab nationalists refer to Israel, proved itself capable of being the tip of a Spartan spear. The U.S. fashioned Israel into a bulwark against socialism and as its long arm in the region. In return it provided Israel with vital diplomatic and strategic cover.
The end of the Cold War guaranteed U.S. dominance and devalued Israel. Thus, in 1991 the U.S. first sponsored the so-called “peace process,” bizarrely elevating its own status in the region to that of an “honest broker,” thereby placating its allies in the Middle Eastern petro-monarchies. This “peace process” led to the Palestinian capitulation of the Oslo Accords and, punctuated by the second intifada and the global war on terror, to today’s “proximity talks.”
After 9-11, Israel resuscitated its worth as a loyal GWOT ally, a bulwark this time against radical Islamic groups and regimes. But this threat has proven to be overblown. Instead the U.S. faces fresh challenges to its hegemony in the Middle East. As the neo-con vision of Iraq as an imperial outpost explodes on the streets of Baghdad, Basra, and Fallujah, the U.S. must come to terms with a simple reality: it cannot keep Iranian influence out of Iraq, and that Iran has called its bluffs on war and “crippling sanctions.”
Meanwhile Israel, at the peak of its power vis-a-vis its neighbours, is aggressively absorbing Palestinian territories, and threatening war against Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah against American diktats. Its attack on the Turkish flotilla was a show of strength for enemies and allies alike.
This threatens American interests. The U.S. does not desire a contiguous war front from Iraq to Afghanistan – even less one from Lebanon to Pakistan – as it conducts its complex withdrawals and strategic balancing acts in the region. Nor does it wish for Israel’s emergence as a regional power acting outside its imperial framework.
This leaves only two options for the maintenance of U.S. dominance. One is a détente with Iran: recognition and guarantees for its ruling establishment in return for delimiting its sphere of influence in Iraq and slowing down its nuclear program. There are indications that back channel talks are already underway between Iran’s ever-pragmatic mullahs and their “Great Satan.” A similar understanding with Syria cannot be far behind. The other option is balancing out Iran with NATO-ally Turkey in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. appears to be exercising both.
Calculatedly repudiating its alliance with Israel to gain legitimacy in the region is part of Turkey’s gambit to reclaim leadership of the Arab world after a century’s hiatus following the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the flotilla incident is not the trigger but the climax of a shifting policy that began last year with Turkey’s rebuke of Israel’s bloody attack on Gaza. Turkey’s pro-Palestinian position will also sap the rising popularity of Iran and Syria as the leaders of the “resistance” against Israel. U.S. strategic planners will appreciate the irony that a major NATO ally may spearhead the Palestinian resistance.
Turkey has simply become more important to American interests in the Middle East than Israel. As a result, Israel will grow more isolated and, while remaining an ally, will gradually lose its carte blanche under an American umbrella. This will not, however, translate into peace in the region or justice for the Palestinians, a prospect opposed not just by Israel but also by most Arab despots. Any American-sponsored Palestinian state will most likely be born on its knees, a moth-eaten vassal entirely dependent on Israel and the U.S.
Under this new strategic architecture, the U.S. will have to negotiate a more diffuse balance of power between Turkey, Iran, Israel, and the Arab states. But with Turkey’s re-emergence, a turn away from Israel, a détente with Iran and potentially with Syria, and a symbolic “peace process,” American hegemony in the region will likely grow more stable.
The Middle East may soon enter a new era of Pax Americana.
American support for Israel began wholeheartedly only after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War when Israel defeated the combined armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, assisted by Iraq – the Soviet Union’s primary Arab allies. The “dagger in the heart of the Middle East,” as many Arab nationalists refer to Israel, proved itself capable of being the tip of a Spartan spear. The U.S. fashioned Israel into a bulwark against socialism and as its long arm in the region. In return it provided Israel with vital diplomatic and strategic cover.
The end of the Cold War guaranteed U.S. dominance and devalued Israel. Thus, in 1991 the U.S. first sponsored the so-called “peace process,” bizarrely elevating its own status in the region to that of an “honest broker,” thereby placating its allies in the Middle Eastern petro-monarchies. This “peace process” led to the Palestinian capitulation of the Oslo Accords and, punctuated by the second intifada and the global war on terror, to today’s “proximity talks.”
After 9-11, Israel resuscitated its worth as a loyal GWOT ally, a bulwark this time against radical Islamic groups and regimes. But this threat has proven to be overblown. Instead the U.S. faces fresh challenges to its hegemony in the Middle East. As the neo-con vision of Iraq as an imperial outpost explodes on the streets of Baghdad, Basra, and Fallujah, the U.S. must come to terms with a simple reality: it cannot keep Iranian influence out of Iraq, and that Iran has called its bluffs on war and “crippling sanctions.”
Meanwhile Israel, at the peak of its power vis-a-vis its neighbours, is aggressively absorbing Palestinian territories, and threatening war against Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah against American diktats. Its attack on the Turkish flotilla was a show of strength for enemies and allies alike.
This threatens American interests. The U.S. does not desire a contiguous war front from Iraq to Afghanistan – even less one from Lebanon to Pakistan – as it conducts its complex withdrawals and strategic balancing acts in the region. Nor does it wish for Israel’s emergence as a regional power acting outside its imperial framework.
This leaves only two options for the maintenance of U.S. dominance. One is a détente with Iran: recognition and guarantees for its ruling establishment in return for delimiting its sphere of influence in Iraq and slowing down its nuclear program. There are indications that back channel talks are already underway between Iran’s ever-pragmatic mullahs and their “Great Satan.” A similar understanding with Syria cannot be far behind. The other option is balancing out Iran with NATO-ally Turkey in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. appears to be exercising both.
Calculatedly repudiating its alliance with Israel to gain legitimacy in the region is part of Turkey’s gambit to reclaim leadership of the Arab world after a century’s hiatus following the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the flotilla incident is not the trigger but the climax of a shifting policy that began last year with Turkey’s rebuke of Israel’s bloody attack on Gaza. Turkey’s pro-Palestinian position will also sap the rising popularity of Iran and Syria as the leaders of the “resistance” against Israel. U.S. strategic planners will appreciate the irony that a major NATO ally may spearhead the Palestinian resistance.
Turkey has simply become more important to American interests in the Middle East than Israel. As a result, Israel will grow more isolated and, while remaining an ally, will gradually lose its carte blanche under an American umbrella. This will not, however, translate into peace in the region or justice for the Palestinians, a prospect opposed not just by Israel but also by most Arab despots. Any American-sponsored Palestinian state will most likely be born on its knees, a moth-eaten vassal entirely dependent on Israel and the U.S.
Under this new strategic architecture, the U.S. will have to negotiate a more diffuse balance of power between Turkey, Iran, Israel, and the Arab states. But with Turkey’s re-emergence, a turn away from Israel, a détente with Iran and potentially with Syria, and a symbolic “peace process,” American hegemony in the region will likely grow more stable.
The Middle East may soon enter a new era of Pax Americana.