A version of this article appeared in The Mark on May 13, 2011, in Asia Times on May 20, 2011 and in The Nation on May 20, 2011
With the world's most notorious terrorist dead, the Afghanistan war moves into its end game.
In the last decade, when the U.S. failed to get Osama bin Laden “dead or alive,” it turned to nation building in Afghanistan, complete with a dissimulating narrative of liberating women and importing human rights and democracy. Now bin Laden is dead, and, while it is still too early to accurately forecast the direction of emerging trends, there are strong indications that his killing will lead to a shift in American strategy in Afghanistan.
The American occupation of Afghanistan faces two distinct military challenges. The first is managing an essentially nationalist Taliban insurgency with Islamist overtones. The second is stifling al-Qaeda, a transnational terrorist organization, and its like-minded allies. Under operational cover of the former, it is the latter that has informed core American interests in Afghanistan.
With the world's most notorious terrorist dead, the Afghanistan war moves into its end game.
In the last decade, when the U.S. failed to get Osama bin Laden “dead or alive,” it turned to nation building in Afghanistan, complete with a dissimulating narrative of liberating women and importing human rights and democracy. Now bin Laden is dead, and, while it is still too early to accurately forecast the direction of emerging trends, there are strong indications that his killing will lead to a shift in American strategy in Afghanistan.
The American occupation of Afghanistan faces two distinct military challenges. The first is managing an essentially nationalist Taliban insurgency with Islamist overtones. The second is stifling al-Qaeda, a transnational terrorist organization, and its like-minded allies. Under operational cover of the former, it is the latter that has informed core American interests in Afghanistan.
In a speech delivered in early 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama reiterated that the American occupation of Afghanistan had a “clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” American intelligence assessments have concluded for years that al-Qaeda has only a nominal presence left in Afghanistan. Its operatives have long since migrated to the relative security of Pakistan, and have set up more lethal franchises in Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Maghreb. Furthermore, al-Qaeda’s links with Afghanistan’s Taliban insurgency are tenuous at best.
Leaving Afghanistan on the basis of intelligence estimates, however, lacks both the psychological satisfaction and the narrative power of exiting on the back of a job well done. From the American perspective, the problem in acting on such assessments has been pulling off a withdrawal that is not seen by the American public and the wider world as a strategic defeat. Such a perception would undoubtedly further diminish American power.
In this context, bin Laden’s killing has provided Washington with an opportune “mission accomplished” moment. The U.S. is now free to shift back to the old script about bin Laden being the effective marker for success in Afghanistan, and to sever its counter-terrorism objectives from the quagmire of counter-insurgency. For it is clear that, despite some tactical successes in Afghanistan’s south, the ramped up counter-insurgency effort has been a strategic failure. Far from imposing a new military reality on the ground, the U.S. strategy has been so ineffective that the Taliban still thinks it is winning the war.
Another indication of a brewing change in policy was the announcement on April 28 – two days before the bin Laden kill-mission – that the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David Petraeus, has been appointed the head of the CIA. The timing of his appointment is highly notable, given that the bin Laden operation was probably in its final planning stages at that point. Furthermore, Petraeus’s CIA directorship is set to begin in September, more or less coinciding with the drawdown of the American “surge” in Afghanistan.
Fresh from the “success” of his troop-surge in Iraq, perhaps Petraeus believed that Afghanistan could become his victory lap. As someone who has literally written the book on American counter-insurgency, Petraeus has been a strong proponent of such a troop-heavy approach in Afghanistan. He has also proved to be a wily political operator. Utilizing skilful lobbying and public-relations tactics, Petraeus deftly outmanoeuvred those within the Obama administration, including, most notably, Vice-President Joe Biden, who favoured an early pullback by switching to a counter-terrorism model.
As the August deadline for a drawdown of the “surge” approaches, Petraeus has largely stuck to his guns, favouring only a token scaling-down of troop levels. However, as head of the CIA, he will ironically gain oversight of counter-terrorism operations just as he loses his clout in directing the military mission, including the pace of the American withdrawal. This opens up the possibility of overhauling the American strategy in Afghanistan.
The Afghanistan war is already deeply unpopular with most Americans – a significant factor with presidential elections slated for next year. In light of bin Laden’s death, Congress is increasingly calling for a faster withdrawal, citing Afghanistan’s diminished strategic value as a result of the dispersal of al-Qaeda and the fiscal crisis in the U.S. With bin Laden in the body bag, and without the resistance of Washington’s star general, the White House will find it easier to adopt an accelerated half-life for its counter-insurgency. Already, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has expressed the view that bin Laden’s death “opens up possibilities for dealing with the Taliban that did not exist before.”
This does not mean that the American military presence in Afghanistan will be reduced to zero anytime soon. NATO has reiterated that it will hover by Kabul’s side for the long haul, despite bin Laden's demise, and even once security responsibilities are handed over to Afghan forces in 2014. This presents a strong likelihood that an abundance of military trainers and a rump of troops will remain in Kabul for years to come. Moreover, the U.S. will likely continue to conduct counter-terrorism operations using Special Forces and CIA operatives in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. But there is little doubt that the full-blown occupation of Afghanistan, backed by a hundred thousand boots on the ground, has effectively entered the end game.
Indeed, the U.S. is anxiously conscious of the cost of its military power being bogged down in Afghanistan while its global competitors, including China and Russia, continue their rise. Thus, the U.S. has been searching for an exit strategy for a while, hinging it largely on a question of political timing rather than military exigencies. This has mostly revolved around exploiting Pakistani-intelligence links to the Taliban to target its leadership and force it to come to the negotiating table.
Pakistan’s co-operation with the U.S. has been opportunistic and stuttering in this regard, in the hopes that prolonging the process will enable it to drive the direction of the negotiations. Pakistan believes that this will fulfil its own strategic paradigm of ensuring a friendly and anti-Indian regime in Kabul. But bin Laden’s death has altered the American political calculus, delivering up fresh possibilities for crafting an exit strategy. Though Pakistan still remains an important link to the Taliban, and provides irreplaceable supply-lines to Afghanistan, its leverage will diminish as a result of political pressure over the potential complicity of its security establishment in hiding bin Laden, as well as in the face of an embryonic, but growing, consensus in Washington in favour of a faster withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The American invasion and occupation of Afghanistan was always about demonstrating American power by hitting back at bin Laden with a sledgehammer, even if other narratives had to be crafted to justify the mission’s high-mindedness or strategic value. With his death in Pakistan, bin Laden’s story can now be uprooted and severed from Afghanistan. Like bin Laden, the tale of Afghanistan’s unending suffering will also be buried in the deep blue sea.
Leaving Afghanistan on the basis of intelligence estimates, however, lacks both the psychological satisfaction and the narrative power of exiting on the back of a job well done. From the American perspective, the problem in acting on such assessments has been pulling off a withdrawal that is not seen by the American public and the wider world as a strategic defeat. Such a perception would undoubtedly further diminish American power.
In this context, bin Laden’s killing has provided Washington with an opportune “mission accomplished” moment. The U.S. is now free to shift back to the old script about bin Laden being the effective marker for success in Afghanistan, and to sever its counter-terrorism objectives from the quagmire of counter-insurgency. For it is clear that, despite some tactical successes in Afghanistan’s south, the ramped up counter-insurgency effort has been a strategic failure. Far from imposing a new military reality on the ground, the U.S. strategy has been so ineffective that the Taliban still thinks it is winning the war.
Another indication of a brewing change in policy was the announcement on April 28 – two days before the bin Laden kill-mission – that the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David Petraeus, has been appointed the head of the CIA. The timing of his appointment is highly notable, given that the bin Laden operation was probably in its final planning stages at that point. Furthermore, Petraeus’s CIA directorship is set to begin in September, more or less coinciding with the drawdown of the American “surge” in Afghanistan.
Fresh from the “success” of his troop-surge in Iraq, perhaps Petraeus believed that Afghanistan could become his victory lap. As someone who has literally written the book on American counter-insurgency, Petraeus has been a strong proponent of such a troop-heavy approach in Afghanistan. He has also proved to be a wily political operator. Utilizing skilful lobbying and public-relations tactics, Petraeus deftly outmanoeuvred those within the Obama administration, including, most notably, Vice-President Joe Biden, who favoured an early pullback by switching to a counter-terrorism model.
As the August deadline for a drawdown of the “surge” approaches, Petraeus has largely stuck to his guns, favouring only a token scaling-down of troop levels. However, as head of the CIA, he will ironically gain oversight of counter-terrorism operations just as he loses his clout in directing the military mission, including the pace of the American withdrawal. This opens up the possibility of overhauling the American strategy in Afghanistan.
The Afghanistan war is already deeply unpopular with most Americans – a significant factor with presidential elections slated for next year. In light of bin Laden’s death, Congress is increasingly calling for a faster withdrawal, citing Afghanistan’s diminished strategic value as a result of the dispersal of al-Qaeda and the fiscal crisis in the U.S. With bin Laden in the body bag, and without the resistance of Washington’s star general, the White House will find it easier to adopt an accelerated half-life for its counter-insurgency. Already, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has expressed the view that bin Laden’s death “opens up possibilities for dealing with the Taliban that did not exist before.”
This does not mean that the American military presence in Afghanistan will be reduced to zero anytime soon. NATO has reiterated that it will hover by Kabul’s side for the long haul, despite bin Laden's demise, and even once security responsibilities are handed over to Afghan forces in 2014. This presents a strong likelihood that an abundance of military trainers and a rump of troops will remain in Kabul for years to come. Moreover, the U.S. will likely continue to conduct counter-terrorism operations using Special Forces and CIA operatives in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. But there is little doubt that the full-blown occupation of Afghanistan, backed by a hundred thousand boots on the ground, has effectively entered the end game.
Indeed, the U.S. is anxiously conscious of the cost of its military power being bogged down in Afghanistan while its global competitors, including China and Russia, continue their rise. Thus, the U.S. has been searching for an exit strategy for a while, hinging it largely on a question of political timing rather than military exigencies. This has mostly revolved around exploiting Pakistani-intelligence links to the Taliban to target its leadership and force it to come to the negotiating table.
Pakistan’s co-operation with the U.S. has been opportunistic and stuttering in this regard, in the hopes that prolonging the process will enable it to drive the direction of the negotiations. Pakistan believes that this will fulfil its own strategic paradigm of ensuring a friendly and anti-Indian regime in Kabul. But bin Laden’s death has altered the American political calculus, delivering up fresh possibilities for crafting an exit strategy. Though Pakistan still remains an important link to the Taliban, and provides irreplaceable supply-lines to Afghanistan, its leverage will diminish as a result of political pressure over the potential complicity of its security establishment in hiding bin Laden, as well as in the face of an embryonic, but growing, consensus in Washington in favour of a faster withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The American invasion and occupation of Afghanistan was always about demonstrating American power by hitting back at bin Laden with a sledgehammer, even if other narratives had to be crafted to justify the mission’s high-mindedness or strategic value. With his death in Pakistan, bin Laden’s story can now be uprooted and severed from Afghanistan. Like bin Laden, the tale of Afghanistan’s unending suffering will also be buried in the deep blue sea.