A version of this article appeared in The Express Tribune on April 20, 2011 and a lengthier version of this article was published by the Transnational Institute in April, 2011
The question of Western intervention in Libya is not immune from considerations of geopolitical power, where the former possesses immeasurably more of it than the latter. Though the exercise of imperial power is always troubling, to oppose the UN-mandated intervention in Libya is to accept mass killing in Benghazi, Tobruk and other rebel held towns as an acceptable moral price for impeccable self-righteousness. And to tell the rebels that they are wrong to ask for intervention is to take a naively privileged, if not a culturally imperialistic, view.
The question of Western intervention in Libya is not immune from considerations of geopolitical power, where the former possesses immeasurably more of it than the latter. Though the exercise of imperial power is always troubling, to oppose the UN-mandated intervention in Libya is to accept mass killing in Benghazi, Tobruk and other rebel held towns as an acceptable moral price for impeccable self-righteousness. And to tell the rebels that they are wrong to ask for intervention is to take a naively privileged, if not a culturally imperialistic, view.
The uprising in Libya is a popular one, united by a program of democratic change. Gaddafi had lost control of upwards of 80 percent of Libyan territory and most major population centres before he struck back with the full weight of his military, using tanks and aircraft to massacre once-peaceful protesters. It is estimated that Qaddafi’s military offensive has killed anywhere between 2000 and 10,000 people. Thus, it is not surprising that the rebels themselves called for the imposition of a No Fly Zone (NFZ).
On the eve of the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 that authorized an NFZ, Qaddafi’s forces were massed outside the rebel capital of Benghazi. Reminiscent of the ritual dehumanization that precedes mass exterminations, Qaddafi had vowed that his forces would go “house to house,” tracking down rebel “rats and vermin.” There is little doubt that he would have made good on his word. Even now evidence of Qaddafi’s brutality continues to mount. An NFZ is unable to prevent loyalist paramilitaries from hunting down rebel sympathizers. Many have been executed or jailed, where torture and rape is not uncommon.
Of course, the dangers faced by Libyans are not historically unique. The UNSC has consistently failed to stem other massacres, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or previously in Rwanda. But for this to be fair criticism, it must tacitly acknowledge that there are situations where imperial intervention may be the lesser evil. Given Qaddafi’s butchery, one can assume that Libya is one – even if not the only – such situation.
There were no realistic alternatives to the intervention that could prevent a slaughter. The Arab League air forces do not have the capacity or command-and-control capability to enforce an NFZ, and there is no stomach, least of all within Libya, for foreign expeditionary forces on the ground. Not to mention that an Arab League intervention would carry its own interests and imperial manipulations, and would not be any less prone to incurring civilian casualties.
By contrast, arming the rebels is a worthy goal. The more the rebels are able to consolidate territorial gains and sustain their own military operations, the less dependent they will have to be on outside intervention. But this was not an alternative to Resolution 1973. Even had there been willing suppliers, getting adequate quantities of heavy weapons into Benghazi on short notice would have been logistically impossible. Moreover, using sophisticated defense systems, much less rolling a tank or handling artillery, is not as simple as driving a pick-up truck tricked out with a machinegun. It requires weeks, even months, of training to gain any kind of proficiency. Surely Qaddafi’s forces would not have stood by idly while the recently-civilian rebels passed through boot camp.
This is not to give the intervening powers carte blanche in pursuing their ends. One can not but regard with foreboding the considerable dangers under the Laws of War and the Hague Conventions, particularly in the vast gray area between the “occupation force” prohibited – on rebel insistence – by Resolution 1973, and an invasion army. Certainly there is a need to resist “mission creep” in Libya, and to counter-engage the UNSC, if not to compel it to act, the next time, say, Israel takes to bombing its neighbours.
Rather, it is to support as far as possible the autonomy of the rebels and the people of Libya who have genuinely risen up to liberate themselves. For those looking to discredit them, there has been a tendency to point to reports suggesting that al-Qaeda has now joined their mix. Perhaps this is true, perhaps not. But should a few jihadist hangers-on’s taint the entire Libyan revolution? Not any more than a few violent anarchists or a handful of neo-Nazis should colour an otherwise decent mass of people across the political spectrum. The simple fact is that all the pro-democracy movements across the Middle East probably contain a tiny percentage of al-Qaeda supporters or sympathizers. Given the support in the legal fraternity for Salman Taseer’s murderer, chances are so did the pro-democracy Lawyer’s Movement in Pakistan. So what? Popular movements are joined by all sorts of people pushing their own agendas and utopian ideas. Democratic revolutions – such as the one in Libya aspires to be – tend to weed out the fringe elements. It is the denial of democratic aspirations that passes the initiative to the ultra-radicals in the wings.
Rebel success in Libya may well depend on avoiding the almost romantic tendency to view the revolution as a militia engaged in the zero-sum game of armed conquest. The rebels’ struggle must remain a political one, with selective armed force a tool of necessity, not choice. They must continue seeking legitimacy from the people of Libya through the strength of their political organization and program, and by respecting human rights and humanitarian norms. They must also seriously turn their minds to a ceasefire and political negotiation rather than hoping that NATO will act as their proxy air force. But in the end it is the rebel leadership that must make such strategic decisions, at the pain of being judged for them by the global community and history. But they ought to be judged as a people literally faced with life and death choices, and not as eloquent armchair anti-imperialists.
On the eve of the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 that authorized an NFZ, Qaddafi’s forces were massed outside the rebel capital of Benghazi. Reminiscent of the ritual dehumanization that precedes mass exterminations, Qaddafi had vowed that his forces would go “house to house,” tracking down rebel “rats and vermin.” There is little doubt that he would have made good on his word. Even now evidence of Qaddafi’s brutality continues to mount. An NFZ is unable to prevent loyalist paramilitaries from hunting down rebel sympathizers. Many have been executed or jailed, where torture and rape is not uncommon.
Of course, the dangers faced by Libyans are not historically unique. The UNSC has consistently failed to stem other massacres, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or previously in Rwanda. But for this to be fair criticism, it must tacitly acknowledge that there are situations where imperial intervention may be the lesser evil. Given Qaddafi’s butchery, one can assume that Libya is one – even if not the only – such situation.
There were no realistic alternatives to the intervention that could prevent a slaughter. The Arab League air forces do not have the capacity or command-and-control capability to enforce an NFZ, and there is no stomach, least of all within Libya, for foreign expeditionary forces on the ground. Not to mention that an Arab League intervention would carry its own interests and imperial manipulations, and would not be any less prone to incurring civilian casualties.
By contrast, arming the rebels is a worthy goal. The more the rebels are able to consolidate territorial gains and sustain their own military operations, the less dependent they will have to be on outside intervention. But this was not an alternative to Resolution 1973. Even had there been willing suppliers, getting adequate quantities of heavy weapons into Benghazi on short notice would have been logistically impossible. Moreover, using sophisticated defense systems, much less rolling a tank or handling artillery, is not as simple as driving a pick-up truck tricked out with a machinegun. It requires weeks, even months, of training to gain any kind of proficiency. Surely Qaddafi’s forces would not have stood by idly while the recently-civilian rebels passed through boot camp.
This is not to give the intervening powers carte blanche in pursuing their ends. One can not but regard with foreboding the considerable dangers under the Laws of War and the Hague Conventions, particularly in the vast gray area between the “occupation force” prohibited – on rebel insistence – by Resolution 1973, and an invasion army. Certainly there is a need to resist “mission creep” in Libya, and to counter-engage the UNSC, if not to compel it to act, the next time, say, Israel takes to bombing its neighbours.
Rather, it is to support as far as possible the autonomy of the rebels and the people of Libya who have genuinely risen up to liberate themselves. For those looking to discredit them, there has been a tendency to point to reports suggesting that al-Qaeda has now joined their mix. Perhaps this is true, perhaps not. But should a few jihadist hangers-on’s taint the entire Libyan revolution? Not any more than a few violent anarchists or a handful of neo-Nazis should colour an otherwise decent mass of people across the political spectrum. The simple fact is that all the pro-democracy movements across the Middle East probably contain a tiny percentage of al-Qaeda supporters or sympathizers. Given the support in the legal fraternity for Salman Taseer’s murderer, chances are so did the pro-democracy Lawyer’s Movement in Pakistan. So what? Popular movements are joined by all sorts of people pushing their own agendas and utopian ideas. Democratic revolutions – such as the one in Libya aspires to be – tend to weed out the fringe elements. It is the denial of democratic aspirations that passes the initiative to the ultra-radicals in the wings.
Rebel success in Libya may well depend on avoiding the almost romantic tendency to view the revolution as a militia engaged in the zero-sum game of armed conquest. The rebels’ struggle must remain a political one, with selective armed force a tool of necessity, not choice. They must continue seeking legitimacy from the people of Libya through the strength of their political organization and program, and by respecting human rights and humanitarian norms. They must also seriously turn their minds to a ceasefire and political negotiation rather than hoping that NATO will act as their proxy air force. But in the end it is the rebel leadership that must make such strategic decisions, at the pain of being judged for them by the global community and history. But they ought to be judged as a people literally faced with life and death choices, and not as eloquent armchair anti-imperialists.
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