A version of this article appeared in The Express Tribune on December 11, 2011
Let me make a prediction. Pak-US relations will soon return to what passes for normal, and any major scaling back of ties will remain at the sole discretion of the US. Pakistan simply remains too profoundly strategically dependent on the US for any other outcome.
Since its inception Pakistan has defined its security pre-eminently in military terms, and pursued an increasingly untenable military balance with India. The strategic arithmetic of this position is as clear today as it was to Pakistani leaders in 1947: An abiding foreign policy of military confrontation with a foe possessing overwhelming strategic superiority can only be sustained with a powerful external patron militarily, diplomatically and economically underwriting Pakistan’s position.
Let me make a prediction. Pak-US relations will soon return to what passes for normal, and any major scaling back of ties will remain at the sole discretion of the US. Pakistan simply remains too profoundly strategically dependent on the US for any other outcome.
Since its inception Pakistan has defined its security pre-eminently in military terms, and pursued an increasingly untenable military balance with India. The strategic arithmetic of this position is as clear today as it was to Pakistani leaders in 1947: An abiding foreign policy of military confrontation with a foe possessing overwhelming strategic superiority can only be sustained with a powerful external patron militarily, diplomatically and economically underwriting Pakistan’s position.
Thus the Quaid-e-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan personally made early (failed) overtures for US military assistance and security guarantees. Liaquat, ever a pragmatist, was equally prepared to pay the Soviet Piper. But at the height of the Cold War the US blinked first. Pakistan flew into the American orbit in the 1950s, eagerly signing on to mutual defence pacts and alliances. There it has stubbornly sought to remain, even though for the Americans it fluctuates between being the prodigal son and the bastard child.
Geopolitical kismet has played a defining role in Pak-US relations. But it is no coincidence that the relationship has thrived in periods of military rule. Realizing that no abiding interests unite Pakistan and the US, the generals have ruthlessly maximized geopolitical rent-seeking to offset their weak bargaining position against American imperial power.
Yet historically, civilian Napoleons in the establishment and the political class have stood shoulder to tasselled shoulder with the generals. Even Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who likened himself to Haffez al-Assad and Kim Il-Sung (comparisons that inspired pride rather than pity in those days), spent much diplomatic capital in upgrading ties to Washington. After all, Pakistan’s military machine, devastated in 1971, needed to be rebuilt to continue the “war of a thousand years” against India.
But the civilian-military entente on India has fragmented since the late 1980s. Most political leaders worth their salt understand that Pakistani peace and prosperity, the legitimacy of civilian rule, and the key to keeping the military confined to the barracks are all tied to a settlement with India. Disposable civilian governments, military adventures like the Kargil fiasco, and even the recent choreographed furor over Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trade status for India are all signposts of military pushback against a potential settlement.
Even now, the military establishment’s real fear is not continuing a servile relationship with the US, but the approaching reality of a return to the 1990s, when Pakistan faded into insignificance for US foreign policy. This fear is now mingled with terror at the prospect of the US forging an alliance with India instead, something a break in relations could hasten.
Thus Pakistani dependence on the US will remain as long as the country is tied to a paradigm of confrontation with India. And there are no stand-ins in the wings. Despite misinformed assertions to the contrary, China possesses neither the political will, nor the economic clout or military muscle to replace US largesse. With an eye on Uighur unrest, China is also increasingly sceptical of Pakistan’s proxy jihadists, a dangerously infectious disease cultivated in Pakistan’s anti-India military laboratory. More obviously, it makes little sense to swap dependency on the US for China.
Confrontation with India and the resultant dependence on the US have made Pakistan an absurd place where security is measured in externally oriented F-16s and ballistic missiles, even when these contribute to the daily internal insecurities of poverty, ill-health, illiteracy, provincial imbalances and insurgency. It has also populated the country with horrors: the suicide bomber, the killer drone, and ever-deepening intolerance are the enfants terribles of our policy failures. All this has made Pakistanis more violently anti-American than even the Iraqis, Afghans, Cubans or Iranians, not because we have been treated worse by American imperialism – we have not – but because of a combustible mix of militaristically defined and officially manipulated security interests, a keen sense of betrayal, and a humiliating dependency that nevertheless keeps forcing Pakistan to curry US favour.
Ironically, the loudest anti-American voices in Pakistan also tend to be the most anti-Indian. They conveniently blind themselves to the reality that to break free of dependence on the US, Pakistan must reboot its strategic security doctrines, and must remain steadfast on the path to normalizing relations with India. Exteriority and incompleteness are encoded in the DNA of Pakistan’s national vision. This vision has failed. Only in making peace with India can Pakistan make peace with itself.
Geopolitical kismet has played a defining role in Pak-US relations. But it is no coincidence that the relationship has thrived in periods of military rule. Realizing that no abiding interests unite Pakistan and the US, the generals have ruthlessly maximized geopolitical rent-seeking to offset their weak bargaining position against American imperial power.
Yet historically, civilian Napoleons in the establishment and the political class have stood shoulder to tasselled shoulder with the generals. Even Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who likened himself to Haffez al-Assad and Kim Il-Sung (comparisons that inspired pride rather than pity in those days), spent much diplomatic capital in upgrading ties to Washington. After all, Pakistan’s military machine, devastated in 1971, needed to be rebuilt to continue the “war of a thousand years” against India.
But the civilian-military entente on India has fragmented since the late 1980s. Most political leaders worth their salt understand that Pakistani peace and prosperity, the legitimacy of civilian rule, and the key to keeping the military confined to the barracks are all tied to a settlement with India. Disposable civilian governments, military adventures like the Kargil fiasco, and even the recent choreographed furor over Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trade status for India are all signposts of military pushback against a potential settlement.
Even now, the military establishment’s real fear is not continuing a servile relationship with the US, but the approaching reality of a return to the 1990s, when Pakistan faded into insignificance for US foreign policy. This fear is now mingled with terror at the prospect of the US forging an alliance with India instead, something a break in relations could hasten.
Thus Pakistani dependence on the US will remain as long as the country is tied to a paradigm of confrontation with India. And there are no stand-ins in the wings. Despite misinformed assertions to the contrary, China possesses neither the political will, nor the economic clout or military muscle to replace US largesse. With an eye on Uighur unrest, China is also increasingly sceptical of Pakistan’s proxy jihadists, a dangerously infectious disease cultivated in Pakistan’s anti-India military laboratory. More obviously, it makes little sense to swap dependency on the US for China.
Confrontation with India and the resultant dependence on the US have made Pakistan an absurd place where security is measured in externally oriented F-16s and ballistic missiles, even when these contribute to the daily internal insecurities of poverty, ill-health, illiteracy, provincial imbalances and insurgency. It has also populated the country with horrors: the suicide bomber, the killer drone, and ever-deepening intolerance are the enfants terribles of our policy failures. All this has made Pakistanis more violently anti-American than even the Iraqis, Afghans, Cubans or Iranians, not because we have been treated worse by American imperialism – we have not – but because of a combustible mix of militaristically defined and officially manipulated security interests, a keen sense of betrayal, and a humiliating dependency that nevertheless keeps forcing Pakistan to curry US favour.
Ironically, the loudest anti-American voices in Pakistan also tend to be the most anti-Indian. They conveniently blind themselves to the reality that to break free of dependence on the US, Pakistan must reboot its strategic security doctrines, and must remain steadfast on the path to normalizing relations with India. Exteriority and incompleteness are encoded in the DNA of Pakistan’s national vision. This vision has failed. Only in making peace with India can Pakistan make peace with itself.
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